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Debts and duties of patients who benefit from medical 
research with reference to arthroplasty1 
Introduction 
Patients who undergo prosthetic replacements and revisions benefit directly from 
embodied knowledge, practice and technology which has been improved by medical 
research. There is an urgent need to improve joint replacement prostheses which currently 
stand at approximately 150,000 hip and knee joint replacements and 20-30,000 revisions 
annually in the UK. (Ollivere, Wimhurst, Clark, & Donell, 2012) The incidence of such 
continues to rise inexorably consequent upon higher functional demand and an older 
population and is predicted to increase by 40% (in the USA) in the next thirty years. 
(Birrell, Johnell, & Silman, 1999) Research on cadavers is required in both successful and 
failed replacements in order to improve the technology of artificial joints to achieve the 
non-controversial medical goals of alleviating suffering and restoring function to a patient. 
At present, the objects of research are mostly the failed joints which are then revised and 
not the successful joints leading to a skewed data set. A patient who benefits from 
medical treatment has a broad duty to contribute to the future research and, in the 
specific case of joint replacement, a defined duty to allow one’s body to be the object of 
research. The duty can be met by consenting to research on his or her body after death.   
The use of cadavers 
The difficulty of engaging in medical research on cadavers is constituted by the central 
tenet of all human societies that the dead are moral objects deserving of respect. There 
are, to which one shall presently turn, obvious cases where such respect can be overridden 
by other factors or moral commitments. The respect afforded to the body in virtue of 
being a dead person is negotiable, but reasons have to be offered to justify the taking of 
body parts or the use of the cadaver as an object which, all things being equal, generally 
constitutes a violation of this respect.  
 
Obviously religious reasons to respect the dead are the most immediate, but these are no 
longer homogeneous in a plural society and cultural attitudes are susceptible to change. 
However, there are also good moral reasons for affording respect to cadavers beyond the 
traditional cultural attitudes of a society and,If an argument for the broader use of 
cadavers in medical research is to be mounted, it must appeal to the more robust and 
universal reasons which appeal to all agents, no matter their religious, traditional or 
background values.2 The reasons for affording respect to cadavers is grounded in the 
moral relationship of care and respect between human beings -- the body  is (or 
represents), in life, identity and, after death, the body remains the focus of care and value 
-- and so one can offer good legal reasons for respecting human cadavers. One’s expressed 
                                                          
1 I would like to acknowledge the contribution of Professor David Deehan, the members of the 
philosophy unit at Newcastle University and the anonymous referees in improving this paper.  
2 Legislation and policy will of course take into account individual preferences, arbitrary choices and 
comprehensive backgrounds (whether religious or not) in order to build an overlapping consensus 
agreement on the treatment and use of cadavers. Here the aim is merely to show that moral 
reasons can be given to a rational agent that justify the idea of a debt to medical research that can 
be fulfilled by a duty. The consent required by the duty will also include an opt-out clause as 
discussed below. 
wishes prior to death are to be executed by those in whom one has placed trust and these 
persons protect the cadaver from arbitrary interference by the state or powerful 
institutions. (Barilan, 2006) 
 
Of course, there are obvious cases where the executor of the cadaver’s will may be 
overruled by institutions: the need for forensic autopsy in the case of suspected crime, for 
example. Skegg seems to suggest that there are resources in New Zealand law for the use 
of cadavers in broad, meliorist practices. (Skegg, 2001) Yet, such a move would be 
controversial undermining trust in institutions as the Alder Hey case did in the UK. (Davies, 
2007) Such an undemocratic and problematic move is just not necessary in arthroplasty 
because Skegg’s argument generally concerns infant cadavers who are unable to give 
consent whereas here we are dealing with the patients offering consent and ensuring that 
their will is respected by relatives in charge of the disposal of the body. Individual consent 
alleviates the problem of trust in large institutions on the part of the public. If an 
argument for the broader use of cadavers in medical research is to be mounted, it must 
appeal to the more robust, universal reasons which appeal to all agents, no matter their 
religious, traditional or background values so that consent to participation in research can 
be procured. 
 
More significantly, there are obvious medical instances when the violation of the cadaver’s 
integrity is morally justified to most reasonable sections of society.3 The paradigmatic 
instance when the violation of the cadaver’s integrity can be morally justified to most 
reasonable sections of society is to donate an organ to save a life. (Diethelm, 1990; 
Thomasma, 1992) If the donor (or the family) were to be asked to explain the reasons for 
consenting, one would assume the most immediate response would be an appeal to 
consequential welfarism: when we take an organ from a cadaver to donate to another, 
there are "significant life enhancements" that can be measured and are observable. The 
act of donation in this case results in measurably greater welfare for the recipient than the 
distress caused to those who are aware of the violation of the physical integrity of the 
cadaver. The value of the cadaver is weighed against the value of very much improving 
another person’s life. Welfarism is not the only justification (or even the best), but the 
process of engaging the practical reasoning of the patient and his or her family in order to 
procure their consent to the future intervention is most immediately expressed in terms 
of welfarism.  It is important to note here that I am not proposing that organ donation is 
only justified by an appeal to welfarism. Whether one is Kantian and believe the rights to 
physical integrity to be inalienable or Hegelian and see it as a constructed institution, 
consent is a required condition for intervention (it transforms a violation into a legitimate 
action).  The claim is more concerned with how the practical reasoning of the patient and 
his or her family would in most probability be convinced and hence how we can rationally 
and legitimately elicit consent. The argument offered is a tool for medical practitioners to 
elicit (or, more strongly, assume) consent from reasonable patients by engaging with their 
rational motivational sets. 
                                                          
3 Agents whose moral commitments are driven by deeper (usually) religious reasons are not 
“reasonable” in the sense required here. Such agents will be tolerated and respected by most 
communities and their liberty to live by their beliefs will not be violated in a liberal society. The 
minimum requirement to respect such liberty is the presence of an opt-out clause in the tacit 
consent agreement proposed below. 
The use of cadavers in medical research 
Here, though, the argument for the use of cadavers is for the purposes of furthering 
medical knowledge and improving technology, so the recipient of a prosthetic joint should 
agree that, after his or her death, that an investigation into the joint and his or her body 
can be carried out to improve both technology and practice for future recipients. It is not 
possible to use a consequential welfarist argument such that all agents ought to leave 
their bodies to medical research. It might be empirically true (although it would have to be 
proved!) that if all bodies became the property of the medical profession at the point of 
death, more and better research could be carried out that would increase medical 
knowledge and, therefore, benefit present and future generations. It is not obvious to the 
particular individual that his or her personal action would result in significant life 
enhancements, even if he or she were able to admit that consequent general blanket 
research may well do so. For those consenting to the use of theirs or other bodies, the 
moral value of the cadaver is not so easily negated in this case because the positive 
consequences are not immediate, can very easily fail, or the research could just be a waste 
of time or be abused by the institution.4 Trust that the moral action contrary to one’s 
immediate wishes is worthwhile requires either robust trust in the institution or evidence 
of “making a difference.” Colloquially, one donates an organ to save a particular life, not to 
further some abstract, vaguely defined goal and the evidence of making just such a 
difference generates the trust required. It is easier to procure rational consent for organ 
donation than participation in medical research (even if more costly to the individual) due 
to this appeal to “making a difference” and its force as an element in one’s subjective 
motivational set. 
 
In order to procure consent from arthroplastic patients to use their cadavers, one cannot 
appeal to the welfarist considerations of furthering medical knowledge or improving 
technology. It is contentious whether such blanket research would result in significant life 
enhancements as the value of medical research is based on a general promise of an 
increase in welfare, rather than an observable outcome,  and such a promise is a too weak 
a justification to overcome the moral commitment to respect cadavers. Moreover, such a 
general moral commitment to medical research politically rests on trust for large 
institutions, private organizations  and government that is obstructed by the shadow of a 
"slippery slope." The simple objection asks what else such a welfarist approach could 
feasibly justify. Moral principles such as the intrinsic value of human life and respect for 
the dead in a secular liberal society serve as very good moral boundaries for the protection 
of the integrity of individuals against the abuse of power by large institutions and 
governments. Such boundaries need to be respected in order for trust in large institutions 
to be maintained. The possibility of asking for consent to investigate the cadavers of joint 
replacement patients after their deaths requires a simple moral argument that would seek 
the agreement of rational agents such that they acknowledge it is a duty which can 
override the social and moral commitment to respecting the integrity of bodies.  
 
So, in order to consider the possibility of asking for consent to investigate the cadavers of 
joint replacement patients after their deaths, a simple moral argument needs to be 
                                                          
4 One knows it would be a good to donate to a children’s charity in general, but this would not be as 
binding as helping the particular, distressed child we encounter, due to the force of appeal to our 
subjective motivational set. One immediately understands  the impact of one’s possible actions. 
generated that would seek the agreement of rational agents such that they believe it is a 
duty which can override the social and moral commitment to respecting the integrity of 
bodies. Consent of the patient overcomes social and religious attitudes (which may forbid 
the violations of cadavers) as well as maintaining trust in large institutions. 
 
Viable consent here takes two forms. The Ideal situation is that patient when receiving a 
replacement joint gives consent for research after death (required consent) and this is 
reinforced by familial consent both at the time and after death. Such consent would 
present the strongest case when considering legal and policy issues of such a request. 
Such consent can be explicit (a signed document) or it can be tacit, as long as the patient 
(and family) are informed at the time of the original operation that by agreeing to the 
operation they agree to research on the cadaver. Presumed consent is not viable simply 
because we live in a plural society and so the assumption that the patient in receiving the 
replacement commits to undergoing research after death does not respect the liberty of 
the individual to do what they wish with their own bodies. There must be, if not a written 
agreement to commit to medical research, an option for the patient to opt-out which is 
made explicitly at the time.  So, either the patient on receipt of the joint agrees explicitly 
(in writing) that they are prepared for their body to be an object of research or they are 
made aware that they must explicitly express that their body must not be used for 
research after their death.5 
The argument 
The sorts of moral reasons needed to motivate an individual to donate their body to 
research can be neither welfarist (a consequential benefit to another person or persons) 
nor can it, when one considers publicly funded health systems, be based on legalistic 
arguments about state ownership of replacement parts. The former argument, as has 
been said above, suffers from the “slippery slope” worry and fails to respect persons as 
moral agents. The latter argument could at best justify the recovery of the body part, but 
no further violation of the cadaver for the benefit of research which is the overarching aim 
of such interventions.6 The types of moral reasons that need to be offered to a patient in 
receipt of a replacement joint are Kantian in flavour and make reference to the debts and 
subsequent duties of the patient. 
 
Kantianism, as a deontological theory, concerns the type of intentions agents act upon. 
(Kant, 2012)7 Actions are either morally forbidden (lying), morally required (keeping one’s 
promises) or simply amoral and permissible (playing football in the park). The taxonomy of 
action is due to the intentions that bring them about. In this case one is seeking reasons 
that require the recipient of medical intervention to commit to the goals of medical 
research. The second point to make is that Kantianism as a moral theory is committed to 
the rational agent and hence an intrinsic respect of the person and, one feels, by extension 
                                                          
5 The present paper does not explicitly argue which form of consent should be the norm and, one 
feels, it would depend on the actual practices of organ and blood donor of the particular country 
where the policy is enacted. My personal feeling is that legally the former is more robust, but that 
practically the latter is preferable, but an argument is required to justify these intuitions. Such an 
argument, due to the exact focus of the present piece, is not here forthcoming for which I 
apologize.  
6 In a longer article, I would have given better explanations of these rather dismissive stances. 
7 See Korsgaard (1996), O’Neill (1990) and Wood (1990). 
the physical integrity of the body. Respect for the body is kept central to the argument 
and not sidelined or negated as it is in the welfarist argument. Third, the respect for the 
agent as a rational being means that the reasons offered make an appeal to his or her 
rationality and hence, if applicable, form the basis of a consensual agreement such that, if 
one acknowledges the validity of the reason, the agent could deny his or her duty to 
medical research only at the cost of his or her own rationality (which is permissible so long 
as it does not directly harm others).  
 
One possible interpretative objection to the reliance on Kant may be his insistence that 
the use of body material (teeth)  is not permissible for the moral agent in the second part 
of his Metaphysics of Morals. (Kant, 1996: 177)  In response, it  is worth noting that Kant has 
no problem with vivisection because the animals are not autonomous nor amputation to 
serve the ends of self-preservation. One would assume that Kant would agree a corpse is 
not autonomous and hence the sorts of mutilation “of oneself” are of one’s rational being 
embodied in a body, not one’s corpse. If Kant does not then there are religious echoes 
corrupting the purity of his assertions and he needs to argue for these.  
 
Morally forbidden actions are those motivated by reasons which involve the agent using 
other persons as tools for his or her purposes and are identified when a reason for action, 
if applicable to all agents at all times and in all places, involves a contradiction.  To discern 
such contradictions, the agent must not act on reasons which violate the categorical 
imperative:  “I ought never to proceed except in such a way that I could also will that my 
maxim should become a universal law.” (Kant, 2012: 4:402) Kant distinguishes between two 
types of contradiction: a contradiction in conception  (whereby your reason for action 
cannot be thought of as a universal law without contradiction) and a contradiction in will 
(whereby your reason for action can be thought of as a universal law, but not imposed as a 
universal law without making one’s purpose unattainable). These two contradictions are 
set as tests for the agent: articulate your reason for action as a universal law covering 
general behaviour (as a maxim) and see whether it is coherent. If it fails the first test, it 
fails the second.  If one, for example, makes a false promise in order to get out of trouble 
or to alleviate hardship, the agent is aware of what promising involves but acting contrary 
to the meaning of his utterance when he says “I promise to pay back my debt” because he 
knows he will not be able to do so.  In essence, he is promising with his fingers crossed 
behind his back and thus not promising at all. And his action will only succeed if he makes 
himself an exception to the rule of promising: everyone ought to keep promises except 
me in this situation, thus it cannot be a universal law because for him to achieve what he 
wants there has to be at least one exception (him). Such contradictions in the meaning of 
actions, as such, lead to specific, perfect duties such as “Don't’ break promises” and “Don’t 
commit suicide”, for example. (Kant, 2012: 4:422-423) 
 
It is possible, though, that some maxims do not exhibit a conceptual contradiction, but are 
still ruled out by the demands of morality. The argument which one finds in Kant which is 
most appropriate to the current discussion is the broad duty to help others. An agent here 
could very well will the maxim not to help others at all and there is nothing forbidden in 
such action. Kant discusses an agent:  
 
... who is prospering while he sees that others have to struggle with 
great hardships (whom he could just as well help), thinks: what’s it to 
me? May everyone be as happy as heaven wills, or as he can make 
himself, I shall take nothing away from him, not even envy him; I just 
do not feel like contributing anything to his well-being, or his 
assistance in need! (Kant, 2012: 4:421) 
 
However, if such an agent imagines what such a world would be like where no one helped 
others, he would quickly realize that he would be unable to take for granted his own well 
being, as Kant continues: 
 
For a will resolved upon this [course of action] would conflict with 
itself, as many cases can yet come to pass in which one needs the love 
and compassion of others, and in which, by such a law of nature 
sprung from his own will, he would rob himself of all hope of the 
assistance he wishes for himself. (Kant, 2012: 4:423)  
 
And so, the agent expects others to help him but not to help them in return and such a 
project of action treats others in such a way as to make oneself a special case (like the 
promising example above).  Such an agent knows that his future happiness is not a gift 
from Heaven, but due to the cooperation and beneficence of others. People depend on 
other people and to deny helping others in a general way, is to not fulfil one’s moral duty. 
 
In the case of medical research, the knowledge which is produced, transmitted, and 
utilized by the medical tradition is a benefit to agents. At some point in our lives, we will 
all  benefit from such knowledge and expertise. The agent who states that he will not help 
others but expects to be helped is well aware that his welfare depends on treating others 
as tools and his own life as a special exception. If one is to benefit from medical research, 
then one ought to contribute to medical research; otherwise one is in the same position of 
the agent who does not will to help others. If all agents denied to contribute to medical 
research and knowledge, then there would be no medical knowledge from which to 
benefit. 
 
In most cases, the duty to contribute to medical research is an imperfect one: there is no 
strict course of action prescribed (as in the case of “Don’t break promises” which is pretty 
unequivocal). One can contribute to medical research through donations, volunteering, 
choosing a career in the medical profession, perhaps even paying one’s taxes. As long as 
one admits there is an imperfect duty for all agents to contribute to the furtherance of 
medical knowledge and techniques, then the agent recognizes it is rational for him or her 
to act according to such a duty. 
 
And this is where we make a second step in the argument. For a patient in general, there is 
a broad, imperfect duty to contribute to medical research.  We all, as recipients of the 
benefit of medical knowledge, have such a duty. Harris seeks to offer a general duty to 
contribute to scientific research by rejecting those moral reasons which seek to deny it. 
(Harris, 2005) The current argument seeks to offer a moral reason to contribute, but does 
not fall foul of the objection that Harris is only able to offer a general requirement with no 
specific action entailed.  (Shapshay & Pimple, 2007) In the specific case of arthroplasty, 
there seems to be a very specific way in which such a moral contribution can be made. Of 
course, a particular patient or relatives of a particular patient may recognize the moral 
debt but argue to fulfil it in another way: through becoming a medical professional, 
donating a large amount of money, agreeing to volunteer and so on. However, there is 
some aesthetic symmetry to the agreement to participate in research which overcomes 
the indeterminate nature of imperfect duties. It also appeals to the practical reason of the 
individual to generate his or her consent in a way that requiring an indeterminate action 
does not and it more likely to be met with agreement. The receipt of the artificial joint is 
to benefit from a specific piece of knowledge, technology and expertise.  One receives the 
benefits of medical knowledge and expertise and therefore has a debt to contribute to its 
furtherance. It is based on a rational obligation. Yet, if one denies a debt there is an 
obvious contradiction. I will benefit from medical research because it prolongs my life, 
restores function or alleviates suffering, but I do so without contributing to medical 
research. If everyone, though, who benefits from medical research refuses to contribute 
to medical research, then there will be no medical research and my purpose would be 
frustrated. Here I have benefitted from a particular piece of technology which my body is 
now in an ideal position to improve for future recipients, just as other agents have 
improved it for me at this time.  I have the obligation, on acceptance of this embodied 
knowledge, to allow tests to be carried out on the joint during my lifetime and beyond 
which could reasonably contribute to the improvement in techniques, knowledge and 
technology. Although, the requirement may seem quite radical implying that anyone who 
has had specific medical treatment should allow tests related to that specific treatment to 
be carried out during their lifetime, it would require in most cases no more than what 
patients actually do: allow a medical profession to monitor the effectiveness of a 
treatment and ensure that the cure is permanent. To not pay this debt by fulfilling my duty 
is to make of myself a special case. 
 
If the agent refuses to consent to contribute to medical research, the agents’ wants and 
needs are still satisfied but at the cost of using others as tools for his own purposes and 
making himself an exception to a rule from which he benefits. Making oneself a special 
case demands justification. If we all sit in a traffic jam on the motorway, we realize that 
there is an obligation to leave the hard shoulder free. Such action, although not in our 
individual and private interest (we would reach home much more quickly if we merely 
drove down the hard shoulder past all the queueing cars), is rational because we know 
that the hard shoulder is required for emergency situations. Should one of us use the hard 
shoulder no damage would be done, but if we all used it, it would quickly become just 
another queue of traffic. And, if in that case, we wished to benefit because we found 
ourselves in trouble, we could not. Our action here rationally involves the recognition that 
if everyone acted similarly, we would have to take the responsibility of frustrating our own 
aims and motives (to be a possible recipient of emergency assistance).  
 
Of course, if we see a car zooming down the hard shoulder, we demand justification. Is it a 
police car or an ambulance?  Is the passenger pregnant and about to give birth?  There are 
cases to make oneself a special exception and so with the case of consent to donate one’s 
body to specific research; for example, if one has strong religious beliefs.8 However, the 
onus is perhaps on such agents to  contribute to medical research but in an alternative 
                                                          
8 Personally, I feel any religious system which allows one to receive the replacement but not 
contribute to research has an awful lot of explaining to do. Jehovah’s Witnesses, for example, are 
not required to give blood because they do not wish to receive a transfusion. 
way. Given, though, that there will be quite acceptable cases where the donation of the 
cadaver to research will be vetoed by the particular agent, consent cannot in this case be 
presumed, it must be avowed consent whether that be explicit or tacit (with a fully 
explained opt-out clause).   
 
The advantages of this approach are myriad. The onus is now on the patient to explain why 
he or she will not contribute to medical research rather than the doctor to persuade the 
patient to contribute. Significantly, by framing the obligation as a moral duty, the patient 
has a present motivation all things being equal to consent to contribute because it appeals 
to his or her rationality: just as, one ought to wear a seatbelt to protect oneself from harm 
in the event of a crash, one ought to contribute to medical research to restore function or 
alleviate suffering in the event of having to benefit from medical knowledge. Moreover, 
the “one” who is to contribute is a universal agent and so the reason applies equally to the 
patient and their immediate family.  
 
As long as one admits there is an imperfect duty for all agents to contribute to the 
furtherance of medical knowledge and techniques, then the agent recognizes it is rational 
for him or her to act according to such a duty. The duty to contribute to medical research is 
an imperfect one: there is no strict course of action prescribed. One may argue that one 
can contribute through donations, volunteering, choosing a career in the medical 
profession, perhaps even paying one’s taxes. The requirement of broad duties, given its 
non-specificity, runs two risks: (1), it is too demanding and does not even require consent; 
and, (2), it is too weak and is easily fulfilled by tax contributions.  
 
(1) Evans puts forward the argument that patients who benefit from medical expertise 
have an obligation to allow their treatment to form part of systematic research and that 
such participation does not require consent. (Evans, 2004) But, he has in mind small 
obligations and harms such as attending clinics and having blood tests. The non-
voluntaristic nature of his obligation is mildly problematic in such cases, but most policy 
makers would baulk at the demand for patients to undergo serious harms, to take 
untested drugs and to undergo invasive procedures. (Perna, 2006) Politically, it would be 
unreasonable to expect agents with comprehensive commitments concerning the value of 
their bodies, the use of certain chemicals, the spiritual cleanliness of certain animal 
derivatives, to be expected without consent to participate in research that may contradict 
such beliefs. Evans does not agree with this and he uses the example of the Maori who 
perceive "large body sizes" as admirable being urged to comply with patient duties to not 
be obese. (Evans, 2007) One wonders whether the example of a Muslim being urged to 
comply with tests which uses material derived from pigs would be as simple and why there 
is a difference, if there is one. Consent, in a plural, liberal democracy, remains the required 
legitimization of the patients’ contribution to medical research 
 
(2) Certain patients already donate their bodies to both research and teaching and many 
more make them available for donation in the case of transplantation, but these are 
supererogatory actions. Normal agents fulfil their duty through the payment of tax.  
Putting aside the problem of private health care, the argument is a non-starter anyway. 
The general undercurrent of the discussion in these pages, though, concerns the very 
relationship between those, including patients, who cooperate in the National Health 
Service specifically and health systems in general. There is a required seachange in both 
the patients’ expectations, medical practitioners’ ability to communicate and 
governmental policy concerning the very nature or ontology of health organizations. The 
current paper lays the foundation for the patients’ realization of their ability and 
requirement to contribute, the doctors’ and nurses’ ability to communicate what would be 
the right thing to do and also the government’s needs to think again about the nature of 
the Health Service. The real problem seems to reside in the belief that as one pays tax, one 
has a "right" to healthcare; that is, the metaphysical error of regarding the NHS as its title 
suggest as a "service." One pays tax to fund the traffic system of roads and therefore has a 
"right" to use, but the payment of tax does not exhaust one’s duties: there are still the 
duties of respecting others, helping others and obeying the regulations. It is unreasonable, 
for example, to claim that the payment of one’s taxes permits one to use the hard 
shoulder because one has paid for it. The traffic system is not a "service" but a cooperation 
which we -- as a community -- see as rational and fund through taxation. The amount one 
pays in tax is never equivalent to the service you actually receive, if one were to pursue 
such an argument, one perhaps ought to consider the economics of post-privatization 
utilities.  
 
Once we have the ball rolling, though, one could reasonably ask why the duty to cooperate 
does not include other areas of research: people with hereditary lung diseases would have 
a duty to participate in lung research, children would have a duty to participate in 
paediatric research and elderly people with cognitive deficits would have a duty to 
participate in Alzheimer and dementia research. And this is where we make a second step 
in the argument. For a patient in general, there is a broad, imperfect duty to contribute to 
medical research and this can be satisfied in a  number of ways.  We all, as recipients of the 
benefit of medical knowledge, have such a duty. However, in the specific case of 
arthroplasty, there seems to be a very specific way in which such a moral contribution can 
be made. The receipt of the artificial joint is to benefit from a specific piece of knowledge, 
technology and expertise and the patient is in a very explicable position to improve this 
defined practice. The doctor then can show the causal connection quite easily in this case 
thus maintaining trust in the institution. In the other examples, the execution of one’s 
duty is (presently) ill-defined because one is researching the ailment or property of the 
patient (which one did not receive through treatment) but the treatment through the 
technology and knowledge.9 
Conclusion 
 
In a nutshell, the reason why recipients of joint replacements have a moral duty to donate 
their bodies to further medical research is about duties and debts. One receives the 
benefits of medical knowledge and expertise and therefore has a debt to contribute to its 
furtherance. It is based on a rational obligation. If everyone who benefits from medical 
research refuses to contribute to medical research, then there will be no medical research 
and the wants of the patient would be frustrated, or if one agent benefits but refuses to 
                                                          
9 The adverb “presently” here carries much weight. In the case of lung disease, for example, once a 
particular and specific piece of technology (pharmaceutical, transplant, artificial part for example) 
has been used, then the same argument can be applied. What the paragraph is at pains to stress is 
that being a child (or old) is not grounds for participation in paediatric (or geriatric) research 
beyond the normal monitoring and measuring which occurs when one visits for a health check or is 
cared for.  
contribute, his or her wants are satisfied at the cost of using others as mere tools and 
making himself or herself an exception to a rule from which he or she benefits. The first 
part supplies a motivation to contribute, the second a moral justification to contribute to 
medical knowledge. The duty then, on receipt of medical research, is to contribute to 
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